Showing posts with label Section 2. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Section 2. Show all posts

Thursday, March 26, 2015

Right to Vote Under Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment


This is an abstract from, Remedial Equilibration and the Right to Vote Under Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Michael T Morley - Barry University School of Law on March 25, 2015, at the University of Chicago Legal Forum.

Repeated legal challenges alleging that proof-of-citizenship requirements for registration, voter identification laws, and other procedures aimed at protecting the electoral process violate the constitutional “right to vote.”  In adjudicating such cases, courts make effectively subjective judgments about whether the challenged statutes or regulations make voting “too” burdensome.

Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment offers critical, and previously overlooked, insight into the scope of the right to vote.  It imposes a uniquely severe penalty, reduction in representation in the House of Representatives and Electoral College, when that right is violated.  The theory of “remedial deterrence,” a type of “remedial equilibration,” teaches that courts take into account the severity of the remedy for a violation of a legal provision when determining that provision’s scope.  Stripping a state of its seats in Congress and votes in the Electoral College is a uniquely severe penalty, effectively nullifying the results of one or more elections, disenfranchising the people who voted for the ejected representatives, diluting the vote of each member of the state’s electorate, and potentially even changing control of Congress or the outcome of a presidential election.

For such a dramatic penalty to be appropriate, a State’s actions would have to be especially egregious, a direct disenfranchisement of certain disfavored groups of people.  Facially neutral registration or voting procedures with which a person must comply in order to vote, in contrast, are insufficient to meet this highly demanding standard.  This remedial deterrence interpretation of Section 2 is consistent with both the Fourteenth Amendment’s legislative history and Congress’ contemporaneous interpretation of that provision during its immediate attempt to enforce it.  All of the state laws and constitutional provisions that Congress concluded violated Section 2 imposed additional qualifications for voting by disenfranchising entire groups of people, such as the poor, the illiterate, or racial minorities, due to their purportedly undesirable traits.  The text and structure of Section 2, the debates leading to its enactment, contemporaneous interpretation and application of that provision, and the persuasive considerations underlying remedial deterrence itself all counsel in favor of construing the Fourteenth Amendment right to vote as prohibiting the actual, direct disenfranchisement of disfavored groups of people, and not administrative procedures for registration or voting.


CLICK HERE to read the the entire document.











NYC Wins When Everyone Can Vote! Michael H. Drucker Technorati talk bubble Technorati Tag in Del.icio.us Digg! StumbleUpon

Sunday, February 1, 2015

Long-Lost Constitutional Clause Could Save the Right to Vote


If you are a reader of this blog, you know I think the Preclearance process of the Voting Rights Act should be part of the Census.

But an important tool remains unused, all but forgotten in a dark and dusty corner of the shed.  Dating back to Reconstruction, it has the great merit of being already enshrined in the Constitution.  According to Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, any state that denies or abridges the right to vote for any reason must have its congressional representation reduced in proportion to the number of citizens it disenfranchises.  Arguably the most radical clause in the Constitution, it was designed to remake the government and the country.  It has never been enforced.

Article I of the Constitution directed that congressional representation be apportioned to the states “according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons…three fifths of all other Persons.”  This was the founders’ politic way of referring to slavery, a word that first appears in the Constitution only to announce its disappearance.  The House passed the Thirteenth Amendment in January 1865, and it was ratified just as Congress reconvened that December.  The founders’ compromise gave the South up to thirty “slave seats” in Congress.  With the abolition of slavery, however, “all other Persons” would now count in full for the purposes of congressional representation, even if not a single freed slave had the right to vote.  Allied with Northern Democrats sympathetic to the Confederate cause, the South would have enough seats to control both houses of Congress.  “All they needed to do was delay and stall” until the 1870 census, Garrett Epps writes in Democracy Reborn: The Fourteenth Amendment and the Fight for Equal Rights in Post–Civil War America, when “once again the Slave Power would be the dominant force in national affairs.”  The successful campaign to abolish slavery would have the effect of significantly increasing the slave states’ power in Congress, perhaps to the point of allowing them to restore their “peculiar institution,” in effect if not in name.

Radicals preferred to grant suffrage outright to the freed men, women, alas, were another matter, but it was clear that such a proposal would not pass even the Northern-dominated Congress, much less be ratified by more than a few states.  In the winter of 1866, only five states, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Vermont, allowed all black males to vote, while New York extended the franchise only to those with $250 worth of property, then a significant sum.  Recent referendums on the question of black male suffrage had been defeated in Connecticut, Minnesota and Wisconsin, as well as in the territory of Colorado, which Congress voted to admit to the Union the following year.  Given the impossibility of explicitly extending the franchise to blacks, the Republicans sought to accomplish the same end by indirect means, or at least to prevent more power from accruing to the South.

The first effort to do so, proposed to the Joint Committee for Reconstruction in December 1865, would have amended Article I to apportion representation on the basis of all eligible voters, not “persons,” in each state.  It would have stripped the South of representation for disenfranchised blacks, but it also would have brought unpleasant consequences for the North.  While roughly 90 percent of blacks lived in the South at the time, an even higher percentage of the country’s non-naturalized immigrants lived in the North.  Perhaps more damaging, so many young men in the Northeast had obeyed Horace Greeley’s exhortation of July 1865 to “go west” that women, who were not eligible to vote anywhere in the country, now made up a disproportionate percentage of the New England population.  Unless those states granted women the right to vote, the amendment would have reduced the region’s representation, thus exacerbating the problem for Republicans.  It was promptly defeated by the committee.

So the proposal was amended to specify that if a state denied the ballot to a single person “on account of race or color,” then “all persons of such race or color shall be excluded from the basis of representation.”  For Northern states without universal male suffrage, their tiny populations of free blacks would render the penalty manageable.  But refusing the ballot to freed slaves would sharply reduce the Southern states’ representation.

Fellow Republicans immediately saw problems with the new formulation: Would it not be easy, they observed, for the South to exclude blacks from suffrage on the basis of something other than race, such as property ownership?  Even so, the House approved the new language, but the amendment died in the Senate, where Charles Sumner of Massachusetts called it “a compromise of human rights,” because he thought it implicitly acknowledged the right of states to deny the ballot to black men.

The Nation magazine joined Sumner in supporting an amendment directly “forbidding any man’s exclusion from political rights on the ground of race or color” and argued, rather optimistically, that whatever the immediate obstacles, it would “certainly be carried before very long.”  An editorial in February 1866 warned against “establishing a bad precedent for the sake of avoiding a temporary inconvenience.”

The Joint Committee for Reconstruction looked at the proposal again after its defeat in the Senate.  Considering the objection that focusing solely on race would allow Southern states to disenfranchise blacks through indirect means, the committee altered the language to say that “when the right to vote…is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State…or in any way abridged,” then “the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion” which the number of disenfranchised bear to “the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age.”  An exemption for “participation in rebellion or other crime” is the dubious basis for state laws that strip an estimated 6 million felons of the right to vote in every election.

Reductions would be allotted proportionally.  For example, if Mississippi, where African-Americans constituted half the population, denied black men the right to vote, the state would forfeit half of its congressional representation.  The rewritten bill satisfied concerns that the Southern states would use indirect means to deny black people the right to vote, and, almost as an afterthought, the committee combined the reapportionment amendment with other proposals it had been working on, including provisions defining citizenship and ensuring due process and equal protection under the law.  Though these have long been the most consequential provisions in what became the Fourteenth Amendment, but the second section, regarding reduced representation, was “the most important in the article.”

But the new formulation still did not answer the concerns that Section 2 amounted to an implied endorsement of a state’s right to disenfranchise voters.  Even after the amendment passed Congress, the House approved it in May 1866, and the Senate in early June, some abolitionists thought it was a step in the wrong direction.  Frederick Douglass was among them: “To tell me that I am an equal American citizen, and, in the same breath, tell me that my right to vote may be constitutionally taken from me by some other equal citizen or citizens, is to tell me that my citizenship is but an empty name.”

High on the long list of tragedies that followed Reconstruction is the federal government’s failure to enforce Section 2 even once.  This country’s history would have been immeasurably happier had Section 2 been implemented or even remembered.

Once it became apparent that the all-white state governments set up by President Johnson did not plan to grant African-Americans even minimal civil-rights protections, Congress took over the revolution it had sought to effect in Southern politics and society.  With the Reconstruction Acts of 1867, Republicans imposed military rule on the Southern states and required them to draw up new constitutions, ratify the Fourteenth Amendment, and grant black men the right to vote, still denied them in much of the North.  In 1869, Congress finally passed the Fifteenth Amendment: “The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”

While many held that Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment was superseded or even repealed by the Fifteenth Amendment, the latter’s explicit reference to race actually makes it in some ways more limited: it disallows only a specific kind of infringement, while Section 2 provides a remedy whenever the right to vote is “in any way abridged.”  In the most literal sense, the Fifteenth Amendment has been obeyed since its passage.  But after a series of blatantly racist Supreme Court decisions and the presidential-election compromise of 1877 ended Reconstruction, a development welcomed, to its shame, Section 2 was openly flouted.  The imposition of poll taxes, literacy tests and other ostensibly race-neutral mechanisms stripped most African-Americans of the right to vote for the better part of a century.

Little was ever heard about section 2 again.  Over the years, a few representatives introduced bills calling for its enforcement, but all came to naught.  In 1904, the Republican Party endorsed it in its platform.  In 1921, when the NAACP launched a campaign to implement Section 2, W.E.B. Du Bois wrote an article in the organization’s magazine, The Crisis, titled “Reduced Representation in Congress.”  By allowing states that disenfranchised voters to maintain the same level of congressional representation, he wrote, “this nation is putting a premium upon oligarchy and a penalty upon democracy.”  Du Bois added: “We have at present only one legal remedy and that lies in the 14th Amendment.”

The first line of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 describes it as “an act to enforce the fifteenth amendment.”  Section 2 of the Fourteenth is never mentioned, probably because it had finally been rendered obsolete.  The promises of Reconstruction, at least those concerning suffrage, were finally redeemed.

In the wake of the Shelby County decision, the Voting Rights Act’s reliance on the Fifteenth Amendment seems increasingly insecure.  Voting-rights advocates largely rely on the second section, with its requirement of proof of racial discrimination, to combat the new barriers to the ballot box.  It was on this basis that a federal district court in Texas struck down that state’s voter-ID law last October, ruling that the requirement served as an unconstitutional, racially discriminatory poll tax, which were prohibited under the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, ratified in 1964.  But wherever a court refuses to acknowledge such realities, the VRA is largely declawed.

Last September, the Government Accountability Office released a report showing that in Kansas and Tennessee, both of which passed voter-ID laws, voter turnout in the 2012 elections declined 2 to 3 percentage points more than in comparable states that did not introduce such restrictions.  The report demonstrated that turnout was disproportionately lower among African-Americans, newly registered voters, and those between the ages of 18 and 23.

Now imagine if Section 2 were finally enforced.  Kansas sends only four representatives to the House, so disenfranchisement of 25 percent of its voting-age citizens would be required for it to lose one.  Tennessee has nine, bringing the percentage down to 11.  North Carolina has thirteen representatives; 7.7 percent of voters would need to be disenfranchised.  Ohio, with sixteen members, would need 6.25 percent; Florida, with twenty-seven members, 3.7 percent, still too high.  But Texas has thirty-six representatives.  Only 2.8 percent of Texans would need to be disenfranchised for the Lone Star State to lose a member of its congressional delegation.

In her decision striking down the Texas voter-ID law, District Court Judge Nelva Gonzales Ramos found that 600,000 voters did not have photo IDs, and that the state had issued a mere 279 new ones before hearings in the case began.  Whatever its intention, Texas likely abridged the right to vote for at least 4.5 percent of its electorate.

“Big deal,” the skeptics may scoff, “one measly representative.”  Enforcing Section 2 would neither end the latest infringements on voting rights nor immediately reverse the balance of power in the House.  But it would contextualize voter-ID laws and related policies within a broader project of voter suppression that’s as old as the restored Union.  The provision was designed, as one of its supporters argued, for a future in which Congress refuses to enforce voter's rights, so that disenfranchising states, in the interim, would “not have the benefit of their wrongdoing.”  A gift from the Radical Republicans of 1866 to the radical democrats of today, Section 2 should figure prominently in the 2016 platform of any candidate or party committed to protecting the right to vote.

For the future, it serves to recall that we are heirs to a tradition resilient beyond imagination.  There are portions of the old structure that need not be cleared away.  They are waiting to be rediscovered and worked into a “repaired edifice” built upon “the firm foundation of eternal justice.”











NYC Wins When Everyone Can Vote! Michael H. Drucker Technorati talk bubble Technorati Tag in Del.icio.us Digg! StumbleUpon

Friday, June 27, 2014

Wisconsin’s Voter ID Law Fight


A federal judge struck down the state's Voter ID law.  In a lawsuit brought by Advancement Project and pro bono law firm Arnold & Porter, they showed that, in burdening the right to vote for Wisconsin’s African-American and Latino citizens, the measure violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA).  In his decision, the judge also rejected the state’s argument that a voter ID law was needed, stating that allegations of voter fraud have absolutely no merit.

The Wisconsin victory marked the first time a voter ID law has been defeated under Section 2, which prohibits voting practices that discriminate on the basis of race.  That’s especially important since one year ago this week, in its Shelby County v. Holder decision, the U.S. Supreme Court gutted the provision (Section 5) of the VRA which required federal pre-approval of voting changes in jurisdictions with a history of discriminatory practices.

On the one-year anniversary of the Supreme Court’s Shelby decision, we are reminded of how much we lost.  Fighting voter suppression laws under Section 2, as done in Wisconsin (a state that had not been previously covered by Section 5) requires taking states to court and proving that their voting laws are discriminatory.  It places the burden on voting rights attorneys and communities of color, and it places tremendous pressure on litigation, which involves vast amounts of resources and time.

Instead of accepting the judge’s decision, the state of Wisconsin is fighting tooth and nail to keep these discriminatory laws on the books.  Last month, state officials appealed the judge’s order, filing with the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals to overturn the ruling.  Now Advancement Project and their law firm face a drawn-out legal battle over the issue, with another set of court arguments expected in the coming months.

It’s unfortunate that Wisconsin officials are using limited state resources in a desperate attempt to defend an unnecessary and racially discriminatory voting measure.

This legal battle is intended to keep partisan politicians in power by restricting the votes of people of color.  The casualties of this war on voting rights will be older African Americans born in the rural South when it was not common to record Black births; people unable to afford time off from work to make it to Wisconsin’s limited DMV offices, which are only open on weekdays and mostly during daytime hours; and the hundreds of thousands of Wisconsin voters, disproportionately voters of color, who lack the required form of voter ID.

What happens next in the state has implications for the entire country.  As the leading democracy in the world, it is our responsibility to ensure states do not enact laws that obstruct the inalienable right to vote.  This is why we should all be watching Wisconsin.










NYC Wins When Everyone Can Vote!

Michael H. Drucker
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Sunday, December 1, 2013

Wisconsin Voter ID Law Back in Court


In 2011, Wisconsin passed one of the strictest Voter ID laws.  It has been on hold during its federal trial in Milwaukee.  It required a voter to show poll workers a government issued photo identification, like a driver's license or passport.

The law was challenged by the A.C.L.U., the League of United Latin American Citizens, the League of Young Voters, and several private citizens.  They sued using under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act which survived the Supreme Court rulings, using the section that prohibits state and local governments from imposing any "voting qualifications or prerequisite to voting" that has a racially discriminatory effect.

The test is whether a law causes minority voters to have "less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process."  The plaintiffs presented substantial evidence the the Wisconsin statute had precisely this effect.

A political scientist testified that it is likely that more than 65,000 residents of Milwaukee do not have the required photo ID and black residents are 40% more likely than whites not to have such ID.  In addition, 1/3rd of those without photo ID do not have the required documents, like a birth certificate, needed to get one.

For those living in poverty or on a fixed income, who are disproportionally people of color, even the $20 charge to get a copy of a birth certificate can be unaffordable, and is in practice no different than a poll tax.

Republican legislators are scrambling to revise the statute to permit indigent voters to take a verbal oath and sign an affidavit that they can not afford the cost needed for the photo ID.  But this would put residents in the embarrassing position of having to declare their poverty in public.

As the reader's of this blog knows, Photo ID laws that are suppose to stop voter fraud are actually another form of voter suppression.

The trial has concluded and we are now waiting for the verdict.

Whichever way the trial goes, the losing side is sure to appeal to the Seventh Circuit.










NYC Wins When Everyone Can Vote!

Michael H. Drucker
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Thursday, June 27, 2013

TX and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act


I spoke about Section 2 in a prior post that allows lawsuits to stop state laws that suppress the vote.

So I just read this from Ballot Access News:

On June 26, Texas Congressman Marc Veasey, who is African-American, and eight other plaintiffs filed a new lawsuit against the Texas photo-ID law for voters at the polls. Veasey v Perry, 2:13-cv-193, southern district. Some of the plaintiffs are voters who lack the approved forms of ID. Others have state ID but the name on the voter’s ID and the name of the voter on the voter registration rolls don’t exactly match and the voter has not been able to resolve the problem.

The Texas law passed in 2011, but it has not yet been implemented, because Texas, as a covered state under the federal Voting Rights Act, had brought a lawsuit (which is permitted under the Voting Rights Act) to persuade a 3-judge court in Washington, D.C., that the Texas law should be pre-cleared. States covered by section 5 of the Voting Rights Act always had the ability to go to court if they didn’t trust the Attorney General of the United States to do a fair job of deciding whether to approve the law.

Texas’ lawsuit had backfired, because the 3-judge court had determined that the photo-ID law would have a racially discriminatory effect. But after the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act earlier this week, the Texas Attorney General had announced the law would now be enforced. The new lawsuit is brought under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, which covers the entire nation and which was not injured by the U.S. Supreme Court ruling. Thus, the predictions that the invalidation of Section 4 of the Act would lead to more litigation has already come true.


Other states where Section 2 could come into play:

1. Mississippi: The state legislature approved a voter ID scheme in 2012, but it has not received DOJ clearance. Despite the restrictions, Mississippi’s secretary of state said Tuesday they would proceed with implementing the voter ID law and that “We’re not the same old Mississippi that our fathers’ fathers were.“

2. Alabama: In 2011, the state passed a law requiring photo ID to vote, but never cleared it with the DOJ. Both the attorney general and the secretary of state said Tuesday they believed their plans could now be implemented in time for the 2014 elections.

3. Arkansas: In April, the Arkansas legislature overrode Democratic Gov. Mike Beebe’s veto to pass their voter ID legislation. With preclearance out of the way, the state law can now be implemented without DOJ review.

4. South Carolina: The Palmetto State passed a similar voter ID law in 2012, but DOJ at least succeeded in delaying its implementation. South Carolina’s attorney general issued a statement following the decision, lauding the Court for allowing the preclearance states to “to implement reasonable election reforms, such as voter ID laws similar to South Carolina’s.”

5. Virginia: Unlike several of the other states, Virginia’s voter ID plan was not scheduled to be implemented until July 2014 anyway. But unless Congress replaces the preclearance formula before then, Virginia will also likely be able to move forward with its plan.

6. Alaska, which just had its own voter ID law struck down, has not moved to restrict the right to vote in less than two days since the ruling.

7. Arizona, which just had its own voter ID law struck down, has not moved to restrict the right to vote in less than two days since the ruling.

8. Georgia, whose own voted ID law was likely ruled unconstitutional, has not moved to restrict the right to vote in less than two days since the ruling.










NYC Wins When Everyone Can Vote!

Michael H. Drucker
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Wednesday, June 26, 2013

Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act


Now that the Supreme Court has suspended Section 4 (preclearance) of the Voting Rights Act until Congress creates a new plan, we need to understand the options of Section 2.

Section 2 of the Act, is a nationwide prohibition against voting practices and procedures, including redistricting plans and at-large election systems, poll worker hiring, and voter registration procedures, that discriminate on the basis of race, color or membership in a language minority group. It prohibits not only election-related practices and procedures that are intended to be racially discriminatory, but also those that are shown to have a racially discriminatory impact. The Attorney General, as well as affected private citizens, may bring lawsuits under Section 2 to obtain court-ordered remedies for violations of Section 2.

In 1980, the Supreme Court held that the section, as originally enacted by Congress in 1964, was a restatement of the protections afforded by the 15th amendment. Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). Under that standard, a plaintiff had to prove that the standard, practice, or procedure was enacted or maintained, at least in part, by an invidious purpose.

In 1982, Congress added protections for voters who required assistance in voting. At the same time, it examined the history of litigation under Section 2 since 1965 and concluded that Section 2 should be amended to provide that a plaintiff could establish a violation of the section if the evidence established that, in the context of the "totality of the circumstance of the local electoral process," the standard, practice, or procedure being challenged had the result of denying a racial or language minority an equal opportunity to participate in the political process.

The Senate Committee on the Judiciary issued a report to accompany the 1982 legislation. In that report, it suggested several factors for courts to consider when determining if, within the totality of the circumstances in a jurisdiction, the operation of the electoral device being challenged results in a violation of Section 2.

These factors include:

1• The history of official voting-related discrimination in the state or political subdivision.
2• The extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized.
3• The extent to which the state of political subdivision has used voting practices or procedures that tend to enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group, such as unusually large election districts, majority-vote requirements, and prohibitions against bullet voting.
4• The exclusion of members of the minority group from candidate slating processes.
5• The extent to which minority group members bear the effects of discrimination in areas such as education, employment, and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process.
6• The use of overt or subtle racial appeals in political campaigns.
7• The extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction.

The Judiciary Committee also noted that the court could consider additional factors, such as whether there is a lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the particularized needs of minority group members or where the policy underlying the state or political subdivision's use of the challenged standard, practice, or procedure is tenuous. However, the Judiciary Committee report describes this list of factors as neither exclusive nor comprehensive. Moreover, a plaintiff need not prove any particular number or a majority of these factors in order to succeed in a vote dilution claim.

In its first review of a case brought under the 1982 amendment, the Supreme Court explained that the "essence of a Section 2 claim is that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred representatives."

The statute continues to prohibit state and local officials from adopting or maintaining voting laws or procedures that purposefully discriminate on the basis of race, color, or membership in a language minority group.

Now that the preclearance division has no work, they should be put on Section 2 cases so they can be fast tracked.










NYC Wins When Everyone Can Vote!

Michael H. Drucker
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