The Independent View: State Election Officials Looking for 2020 Voting Machines Still Vulnerable to Hacking

State Election officials Looking for 2020 Voting Machines Still Vulnerable to Hacking. The New Machines still pose Unacceptable Risks in an Election that U.S. Intelligence Officials expect to be a Prime Target for Disruption by Countries such as Russia and China.

The Machines that Delaware, Georgia, Philadelphia, and perhaps many Other Jurisdictions will buy before 2020 are an Improvement over the Totally Paperless Devices that have Generated Controversy for more than 15 years, Election Security Experts and Voting Integrity Advocates say. But they Warn that these New Machines still pose Unacceptable Risks in an Election that U.S. Intelligence Officials Expect to be a Prime Target for Disruption.

The New Machines, like the ones they’re Replacing, allow Voters to use a Touchscreen to select their Choices. But they also Print out a Slip of Paper with the Vote both Displayed in Plain Text and Embedded in a Barcode, a Hard Copy that, in theory, would make it Harder for Hackers to silently Manipulate the Results.

Security Experts Warn, however, that Hackers could still Manipulate the Barcodes without Voters Noticing. The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine has also Warned against Trusting the Barcode-based Devices without more Research, saying they “raise security and verifiability concerns.”

That hasn’t Stopped some States from Forging ahead, however, as they face Pressure to Retire their Outdated Paperless Machines before the Next Presidential Race.

The Replacements, known as Ballot-Marking Devices, are “a relatively new and untested technology,” said J. Alex Halderman, a Voting Security Expert who Teaches at the University of Michigan. “And it’s concerning that jurisdictions are rushing to purchase them before even basic questions have been answered.”

Many States have Adopted what Experts call a much more Secure Option, Paper Ballots that Voters Mark with a Pen or Pencil and that are then Scanned and Tallied. But Election Officials in Delaware, Georgia, and Philadelphia have Rejected that Option, saying they are Secure enough and Better suited for many Voters with Disabilities, even thought the Paper Ballot Vendors also make Machines for Voters with Disabilities.

Philadelphia City Commissioners on Feb. 20th Selected a Barcode system called the ExpressVote XL from the Major Vendor Election Systems & Software (ES&S), despite Warnings about the Risks. So did Delaware, which in September chose the ExpressVote XL as part of a $13 Million Overhaul of Election Equipment.

Earlier this week, Georgia Lawmakers advanced a Bill to Approve the Barcode Devices in a 101-72 vote that Split along Party Lines. Democrats tended to agree with Experts who have said the Machines are still too Vulnerable. “Right now, we do not have the ability to conduct elections safely and securely and be able to correctly audit them," said Georgia State Rep. Jasmine Clark (D-108th District), "When it comes to people being able to access the democratic and make sure their vote is counted, paper is the way to go.”

Republicans largely hailed the Technology. “We can put our voters first in Georgia and bring us into the 21st century,” State Rep. Barry Fleming (R-121st District) said after the vote.

Georgia has long been at the Center of the Debate over Insecure Voting Technology. Election Integrity Groups Unsuccessfully Sued to Ban the State’s Paperless Voting Machines before then-Secretary of State Brian Kemp’s 2018 Gubernatorial Victory over Democrat Stacey Abrams. A Judge agreed that the Paperless Machines posed an Unacceptable Risk but Ruled that it would have been too Disruptive to Change systems Months Ahead of the Election.

In January, a Commission created by Kemp recommended Replacing those Paperless Machines with Barcode Devices. Election Security Experts had urged the Committee to Instead Recommend a Paper-Based system.

States, Cities, and Counties switching to New Technology will probably have to Live with their Choices for years to come, given the Expense and Difficulty of Changing systems.

The Dispute over the Ballot-Marking Devices centers on the fact that they use Barcodes, which can be Read by Scanners but Not by Humans. Though the Paper Records also Display a Voter’s Choices in Plain Text, which the Voter can Double-Check, the Barcode is the part that gets Tallied without comparing what is on the Paper. The Danger is Hackers who Infiltrate a Ballot-Marking Device could Modify the Barcode so its Vote Data Differs from what’s on the Printed Text. If this happened, Voters and Election Workers would have no way of Spotting it. “We simply don't know whether BMDs can generate a paper trail that’s sufficiently hard for attackers to manipulate,” Halderman said.

To handle this problem, there has to be a Sample Manual Audit comparing the Paper Trail against the Barcode Tally.

Even so, many State and Local Officials believe that the Ballot-Marking Devices are a vast Improvement over a Fully Paperless system. Ballot-Marking Devices also Address Accessibility concerns about Totally Paper-based Systems.

But Election Security Advocates have suggested Precincts use Paper-Based Systems for most Voters and a few Ballot-Marking Devices producing a Paper Ballot for People with Disabilities.

“It's critically important that we make voting easier and equally accessible for all Philadelphians while also considering the need for a secure, resilient voting system,” Al Schmidt, a Member of the Philadelphia City Commission, said in a Feb. 20th Statement after the Group voted to Select the ES&S ExpressVote XL. “Every voter in Philadelphia should be confident that their ballots are cast securely, and their votes are counted accurately, and our new, auditable paper ballot system will help ensure that.”

But the Barcode-based Setup “makes a mockery of the notion that the ballot is ‘voter-verifiable,’” said Duncan Buell, a Computer Science Professor at the University of South Carolina, because “what the voter verifies is not what is tallied.”

“It basically turns the system into one that has all of the well-known problems that paperless … voting machines have,” said Matt Blaze, a Computer Science and Law Professor at Georgetown University. “You have to trust the software that’s being used to cast the vote.” “This bad ballot-marking technology is a really unfortunate development,” he added, “and it’s one that I’m hopeful will not proliferate.”

In a Landmark Report Published last year, the National Academies Recommended against Voting Devices that Tally Barcodes. “Electronic voting systems that do not produce a human-readable paper ballot of record raise security and verifiability concerns,” it said. “Additional research on ballots produced by BMDs will be necessary to understand the effectiveness of such ballots."